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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

\VILLI AP! T. BLODGETT and
FL0°Ll'JCE G. BLODGETT, his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
-vsCivil No. 15608
JOE MARTSCH; BETTY PURCELL, aka
Betty Purcell Martsch; DOYLE NEASE;
RACO CAR WASH SYSTEMS, INC., a Utah
corporation; WAYNE A. ASHWORTH,
Trustee; KARL W. TENNEY; VALLEY
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking
corporation; FIRST SECURITY BANK
OF IDAHO, N.A.; STATE OF UTAH and
JOHN DOES l through 10,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, JOE MARTSCH

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants seek a reversal of the summary

judgment

yranted below against appellants in favor of the respondents
and this respondent, Joe Martsch, seeks affirmation of such
judgment.
DISPOSITION IN THE L0\'1ER COURT
On October 20, 1977, the lower court granted summary
judgment in favor of respondents Joe Martsch, Wayne A. Ashworth,
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Karl W. Tenney, and Valley Bank & Trust Company.
3, 1976, the lower court entered an order denying app0lla':
motion to amend or alter judgment.

On October 20, 1977,

the lower court granted summary judgment in favor of resc:,:
State of Utah.

All remaining parties to the action were

either dismissed without prejudice by appellants or judqre:
was taken against them.

In the case of

Doyle Nease and

John Does 1 through 10, the parties were never served.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This respondent, Joe Martsch, asks that the appeal
be dismissed and that the judgment in his favor be affirme'.,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to September 21, 1973, appellants were the
owners in fee title of two contiguous parcels of ground in
the South Salt Lake area near the Van Winkle Expressway.

c·

parcel has been variously referred to as the car wash proFs:·
and the other piece of property has been variously referrs:,
to as the grocery store property.

In 1971 appellants

en~~

into a lease with Raco Car Wash Systems and Betty Purcell,
defendants, covering the car wash property.
proposed to erect a car wash on the property.

The lessees
This lease,

by its terms, specified that the car wash property was to
be subordinated to assist the lessees in obtaining fina~c:·
for the construction of the car wash.
The respondent Valley Bank proceeded to prcrarc .-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-::::-

lo~n

documents for the financing of the car wash.

On

No•1ember 5, 1971, appellants were called to the respondent
tJnk for the purpose of executing various documents on the
car wash loan.

There and then appellants executed and

delivered to Valley Bank a Trust Deed dated November 5, 1971
and recorded November 9, 1971, which specifically described
both parcels of land and was given to secure a debt for
$24,000.00.

This named Valley Bank as Trustee and Beneficiary.

When the note became delinquent, appellants were notified and
had the opportunity to pay.

Thereafter, on March 23, 1971,

Wayne A. Ashworth was duly substituted as Trustee and such
substitution was recorded April 5, 1973, along with an
appropriate Affidavit of Notification.

Notice of Default

was recorded and given as required by statute on April 5,
1973, and after three months Notice of Sale was duly given
to appellants.
The sale was scheduled for September 20, 1973 at
the Courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah.

The appellants were

personally present at said sale, listened to the bids, but
remained silent and refused to bid to protect their interest
in the property.

Mr. Lorin Pace, attorney, bid in the pro-

perty for Mr. Joe Martsch for $30,000.00, and this sum was
then paid (deposition of Donald Sawaya, p. 8).
Following payment of the $30,000.00 by Mr. Martsch,
a proper Trustee's Deed covering all of the property was then
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executed by Mr. Ashworth, as Trustee, and recorclecl ins"::
Lake County.

Mr. Martsch has since been the owner of t'c

property except as to a strip later sold to the Statu of
Utah for highway purposes.

The Trustee's Deed was rcoul:·

on its face, containino all required recitals, and not'.ii::
appears in the record to show any 0'rsonal knowledge

of:~.

Mart sch as to the dealings between appellants and Valle·
Bank upon which allegations of fraud, etc. are made.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
JOE MARTSCH IS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE
AT TRUSTEE'S SALE WITHOUT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF
APPELLANTS' DEALINGS AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH
VALLCY f'/,NK.
POINT II
THE DEED TO JOE MARTSCH FROM TRUSTEE AT SALE
UNDER TRUST DEED CONTAINS ALL REQUIRED RECITALS,
IS REGULAR ON ITS FACE AND IS CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE BY TRUSTEE.
POINT III
APPELLANTS PERSONALLY ATTENDED TRUSTEE'S SALE,
MADE NO OBJECTION AND DID NOT BID, AND ARE
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING ANY DEFICIENCY IN
NOTICE OF SALE.
The Utah statutes, Section 57-1-28, Utah Code
Annotated, relating to trust deeds such as the one in\·ol•·'
in this transaction, provides that after payment of the
price bid by a purchaser at a trustee's sale, the trustee''
deed may contain recitals of compliance with the
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of the Act relating to exercise of the power of sale and the
sale of the property described therein, "and such recital
shall constitute prima facie evidence of such compliance and
conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers
and encumbrancers for value and without notice."

This

respondent, Joe Martsch, has the full benefit of such statutes,
as he was a bona purchaser for value ($30,000.00) at a higher
price than that bid by Valley Bank & Trust Company at the
same sale, without notice of the dealings between appellants
and Valley Bank.

Those dealings were well prior to the time

of any involvement of Mr. Martsch and in his absence, and if
such constitute a basis of a cause of action between the
appellants and the bank, that is something wholly apart from
the position which Mr. Martsch occupies.
His bid was made by his attorney, Mr. Lorin Pace, at
the said trustee's sale conducted by the trustee, Mr. Ashworth,
through his attorney, Mr. Sawaya, at the time and place
designated in the notice of sale.

It is of great importance

to note that the appellants were personally present at the
time of said sale.

They made no objection to the sale and

did not bid in at a higher or better price to protect the
interests which they assert in the property.

Well in advance

of the time of said sale, they were aware of the fact that
both parcels of property were involved in the transaction,
and they had consulted legal counsel relative to what could
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or should be done.

Said legal counsel was not presenl at

the time of the sale, but the appellants were both there.
It is to be observed that the statute provides tha:
such recitals constitute prima facie evidence of such

C'Grr-

pliance and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona
purchasers for value and without notice.

This stands as

insulation between Mr. Martsch and the appellants in the"
assertions of overreaching, nondisclosure,
Valley Bank.

fraud, etc.,

They assert that as between them and

b~·

Valle~

Bank that they had thought that the trust deed which they
signed was only relating to the property upon which the

c~

wash was to be constructed, but in truth and in fact the
said document itself covers both the car wash and the groc2:
store area adjoining it, and said legal descriptions are
clearly set forth therein and were there at the time that
was signed by both of the appellants.

Apparently they bcc:-

aware of this some time later on, as the note became del~
quent, and the bank advised them that they were in peril

J'

losing both the car wash property, which they had leased tc
Raco, and the grocery store property which they occupied.
Thus at the time of the sale they were not innocen'.'
wholly unaware of the peril in which their property stoo::,
but had consulted legal counsel and had gone to the cour:
house at the time and the place set in the notice of salt:.
At no time do they contend that they did not receive 1wr'.
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nf the sale, but their only assertion is that in the published
notice some mechanical defect in the legal description did
exist.

They had met with legal counsel and apparently through

some misunderstanding he had gone to the wrong entrance to
the courthouse, whereas the appellants themselves were at
the proper place and witnessed, without objection, the offering of the property for sale, the bid by Valley Bank, and
finally the bid by Mr. Lorin Pace, legal counsel for Joe
Martsch in the successful purchase of the property at the
trustee's sale for $30,000.00.

There was no contention that

the $30,000.00 was not paid.
Some objection is raised to the fact that the
$30,000.00 was paid the following morning instead of "forthwith".

Such determination of the time of payment of the

funds bid

(a cashier's check being required) was discretionary

with the trustee.

No prejudice can be asserted or shown, nor

has such appeared in the record, by reason of the payment of
the $30,000.00 for the purchase price the first thing in the
morning following the sale, rather than the afternoon of the
sale.
It was for the very purpose of obviating such minor
hypertechnical objections that the legislature of Utah, as
[)art of the Trust Deed Act, adopted Section 57-1-28, making
the recitals and the effect of the trustee's sale as cons'. ituting prima facie evidence of the compliance of the
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trustee with the rel!Uireci steps and "conclusive c'.riclcnce
thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers."
The final straw on

~hich

appellants seem to hang

their contentions that the trust deed did not effectivPly
transfer title to the property from the appellants via the
trustee's sale through the deed of trustee to Jee

Martsc~.

is that Joe )lartsche and Betty Purcell were "corrunon law
husband and wife" in Idaho.

Such factor has no relevancy

in this proceeding, as Mr. Martsch himself borrowed the
money from the bank in Idaho and paid the $30, 000. 00 to th2
trustee in pursuance of the trustee's sale of the trust
deed

propert~·,

and received the conveyance therefrom in

good faith and for valuable consideration.

Likewise, the

fact that subsequently he sold a portion of the property
to the State of Utah for highway purposes, has no

releva~

in this proceeding.
The court below, having had the benefit of the
affidavits of parties, the depositions and the motions

f~

summary judgment, and being fully advised, properly deter~.::
that as to Joe Martsch he was the bona fide purchaser oft'
property at the trustee's sale and was entitled to the be~,of the provisions of Section 57-1-28, and that the effect c:
the said deed was

as set forth in Section 57-1-28

(2):

(2)
The trustee's deed shall operate to convey
to the purchaser, without right of redemption,
the trustee's title and all right, title, intere~:
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

and claim of the trustor and his successors in
interest and of all persons claiming by,
through or under them, in and to the property
sold, including all such right, title, interest
and claim in and to such property acquired by the
trustor or his successors in interest subsequent
to the execution of the trust deed.
Title did vest in Joe Martsch, free and clear from
all claims of the appellants.

They have their recourse, if

any, against Valley Bank, and if any, against the trustees,
but not against the purchaser at the trustee's sale,
respondent Joe Martsch.
WHEREFORE, respondent Joe Martsch urges that the
appeal be dismissed as to him and that the court affirm
the decision of the lower court on summary judgment, that
the deed to Joe Martsch did effectively transfer all right,
title, interest and claims of the appellants, as trustors,
in and to the property sold to Mr. Joe Martsch.
Dated this

S>.f;~ day

of May, 1978.

Utah 84101
Attorneys for respondent
Joe Martsch
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I certify that on the

of May , l 9 7 8 ,

two (2) copies each of the foregoing Brief of Respondent,
Joe Martsch, were mailed to the following:
Mr. Irving H. Biele
Attorney for Respondents
Valley Bank & Trust Company
and Tenney
80 West Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Mr. Donald Sawaya
Attorney for Respondent Ashworth
2805 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Mr.
Joseph C. Rust
Attorney for Appellants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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